The Shaping of a Policy Framework for the Wider Europe

Michael Emerson

Figure 1: Mapping the Wider Europe and its Neighbourhood

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FOR THE WIDER EUROPE

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With the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25, the new Wider Europe debate – interpreted in the broad sense as in this paper – rises high up on the EU agenda, complementing the draft Constitution prepared by the European Convention. Together they are defining what the EU is to be. The Convention is defining the EU from the inside. The Wider Europe debate is seeking to define it by reference to its outer edges and wider neighbourhood.

Already in March 2003, the European Commission published a first policy communication on the subject.[1] This has been followed by the document on European security strategy submitted to the European Council in June 2003 by Javier Solana,[2] the optique of which is different, but whose content overlaps with the Wider Europe. These two documents may be viewed as 'white' or 'green' papers of the EU institutions. They are important references, yet highly preliminary and incomplete. The present document sketches a more structured policy framework, and makes proposals for how this might be further developed.

1.   Primary concepts

There is need for clearer conceptualisation of this debate. Two distinct terms are being used: *'Wider Europe'*, and *'Neighbourhood'*. The Commission's paper has the two confused in its title.

'Wider Europe' can keep to the perfectly well-identified space of Council of Europe membership. Uncontroversially this is Europe, and all its peoples have a degree of identification with its values, history and cultures. Even the most disorderly and distant parts of the Wider Europe, for example the South Caucasus, have European aspirations. At the level of territorial coverage Wider Europe policy should ideally embrace all the different categories of states and entities of Europe not already acceding to the EU or engaged in accession negotiations, since otherwise there will be problems of lack of coherence. In particular the Commission's proposed exclusion of the Caucasus from the Wider Europe would need to be corrected, which the Solana paper seems already to hint at.

Wider Europe is the space in which *'Europeanisation'* can be said to be the general objective, without overtones of cultural imperialism. Europe belongs to all these peoples.

'Europeanisation' has become a special form of modernisation for the formerly communist and fascist dictatorships, as well as the still weak states of Europe. It is a process that all Europeans may consider that they own and with which they can identify. The distinction is made between accession to EU membership (as a formal legal and political act) and Europeanisation as a wider process of political, economic and societal transformation. The ideology of Europeanisation appears to be democratic, liberal (of social-democratic colour), non-hegemonic, multinational and multi-cultural, inclusive and integrative.

Europeanisation may be seen as working through three types of mechanisms:[3]

- precise legal obligations coming indeed from preparing for accession to the EU and acceding to the Council of Europe (which effectively serves as the EU's human rights training school and enforcement agency),
- through changing the beliefs, expectations and identity of the individual (regional/ethnic, national, European), and
- changing domestic rules of the game in politics and business, altering the strategic position of domestic actors.

Synthesising these mechanisms of economics, politics, law and sociology is the vital yet subjective will of the individual, political parties and interest groups to accept or even push for the adoption of European norms of business and politics. The key mechanism of Wider Europe strategy may be viewed to be 'Europeanisation' as here defined. For a more vivid view of Europeanisation, one may take the words of a Bosnian politician:

> The EU leverage is identification of the EU in the (Balkan) region as an area with security, jobs, a decent and rising standard of living, the rule of law upheld by accountable, democratic, clean public institutions, and a system of minorities protected by law, not by the carving out of territories…. Without recognition that the future of the region is in the EU, there is no chance for the implementation of a coherent plan. Not only the political elite, military officers, intelligentsia, but also the majority of the public should share this opinion. For the first time all the countries from the region, even the participants in the recently ended conflict, are attempting to join the European mainstream (excerpted from a paper by former Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic).

Europe's *'Neighbourhood'* goes wider. To the South and South-East it embraces first of all the Mediterranean states of the Maghreb and Mashrek, which are already subjects of the heavily structured Barcelona process. These states link to the rest of the Middle East, however, including the Gulf states, and these link on to Afghanistan. Europe's neighbourhood extends to the East to Russia's neighbours of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia, as now represented politically by the map of OSCE membership. This vast belt of territory and peoples may be called the *Greater Middle East.*

From North Africa to Central Asia this is the Muslim world (with the singular exception of Israel), which today has become Europe's main source of security threats, linking the hazards of terrorism, trafficking, illegal immigration, weapons of mass destruction and cultural and ideological confrontations. Westerners recommend to this vast region variants of their liberal democratic model. But neither the West – the US and Europe – nor the countries of this region themselves have clear ideas of how these non-democratic regimes may be reformed

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[3] For a presentation of the concepts and application to southern Europe, see K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias, eds., *Europeanisation and the Southern Periphery*, Frank Cass, London, 2001.

and perhaps transformed. The sensitivity to cultural imperialism is so acute that it connects with the discourse of the Islamic fundamentalist hyper-terrorist.

While the United States becomes less of an external actor in the Wider Europe as the EU widens and deepens, it remains the leading external actor in much of the Greater Middle East. The issue of coherence and coordination between the EU and US policies is crucial for the Greater Middle East, especially in view of the divergences of ideology recently on display between Washington's neo-conservative elements and most Europeans. This also means that North America, or the transatlantic community (coherent or incoherent as the case may be), has also to be regarded as part of Europe's neighbourhood.

The more precise and logical terminology for the Wider Europe debate might then be to say that the 'Wider Europe' is indeed Europe (of the Council of Europe map), whereas its wider neighbourhood consists of the 'Greater Middle East' – see Figure 1 on the front cover. North America may be viewed as part of Europe's neighbourhood too, but in the present context, this concerns mainly the United States as actor in the Greater Middle East. The whole subject may for convenience be called the 'Wider Europe', but only as shorthand for the 'Wider Europe and its Neighbourhood in the Greater Middle East'.

2.   Five arguments driving a Wider Europe strategy

For the continent of Europe 'Europeanisation' is an *idealistic argument*, since security threats from within this Wider Europe are now much reduced and the ideology is commonly understood. For the Greater Middle East the matters of ideology are not settled and for the West the *realist argument* is to limit security threats, which means that the EU and the US have to try to work together there. These distinctions, both territorial and ideological, are of course only approximate, and there are fuzzy borders between the continents in places, and to a degree ideology has universal foundations. But still the distinction between these first two arguments – the idealist and the realist – is categorical, and has crucial policy implications.

Thirdly, *the efficiency argument* searches for the most effective organisation of policy spaces in a complex continental region, and the optimal distribution of jurisdictions and powers by level of government in multi-tier settings. For some policies, or economic networks and infrastructures, geography will be a dominant factor, such as river basins or seas. But for other policies political commonalities are far more important. Also there is the search for the most efficient blend of multilateral structures and bilateral relations.

Fourthly, there is a *circumstantial argument* alongside these three timeless arguments. The current huge expansion of the EU to 25 member states is going to take years to digest institutionally. Yet there is already a list of further potential candidates. While the prospect of EU accession is the strongest incentive for Europeanisation, the EU's Wider Europe policy seeks to extend this influence as far as possible without full membership for the time being.

Fifthly, there is the *comparative advantage argument.* The EU's still fragile and incomplete foreign policy system also underlines the need for the EU to make a credible job of what it can do best in the broad field of external relations. This means Europeanisation of its neighbourhood in the first place, more than global power projection. Wider Europe policy may be a key to resuming progress towards common foreign, security and defence policies after the devastating split caused by the Iraq war.

3.   Images of variable geometry

Since Wider Europe policy is going to be highly complex in practice, it needs some simplifying images (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Model types for the organisation of a complex region

- The *hub-and-spoke* system represents bilateral relations between a leading power and many smaller states or entities.
- The *cobweb* system is where there are successive concentric circles of state and entities surrounding (or neighbouring, or dependent on) the leading power, but where there are multilateral relations around each circle as well as bilateral relations with the leading power.
- The *matrix* represents the disaggregation of the relations between a leading power and a complex region by policy domain and by state or entity.
- The *Rubik cube* represents the same matrix where there is more than one leading power.

A dominating power (or hegemon), be it global or regional, naturally tends towards *hub-and-spoke* systems. However each bilateral relationship between hub and spoke may be broken down into its various policy dimensions and sectors, which is certainly relevant for the specific case of the EU and its neighbours. This suggests a *matrix*. In practice for the EU and the Wider Europe one can identify in the geographic aspect numerous states or entities of the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East beyond the EU of 25 member states. The EU (25) of 450 million population represents only a little over half of the population of the Wider Europe (of the Council of Europe map), but about 90% of its national income. The Greater

Middle East adds almost 400 million more in population, but only another 10% in national income (see Table 1).

Table 1. Summary statistics of Wider Europe and its neighbourhood, 2001 data

	Number of states	Population, (millions)	National income ($ billions)
Wider Europe			
EU	25	450	8,500
Other West Europe, EEA/EFTA & micro-states	8	12	433
EU candidates	3	96	219
Other South-East Europe, SAA states	5	24	43
European states of CIS	7	225	313
Non-recognised secessionist entities	4	3	
Total, Wider Europe	**52**	**810**	**9,508**
Greater Middle East			
Mediterranean	10	174	255
Gulf (GCC), Iraq, Iran	9	135	590
Central Asia, Afghanistan	6	83	41
Total, Greater Middle East	**25**	**392**	**886**
Total, Wider Europe and Greater Middle East	**78**	**1,202**	**10,394**

As regards the policy aspect, seven major policy dimensions are identified, as in Table 2. The huge number of cells in the matrix is more than can receive individualised attention. In order to simplify the system there has to be recourse to multilateral relations between the EU and groups of neighbours, for which the image of *concentric circles* is often referred to. However in practice the system becomes a blend of bilateral and multilateral features, for which the *cobwe*b image serves better.

Yet even this subtler image encounters a further complication when there is more than one hub, with overlapping spokes and cobwebs. This is the case with respect to the EU, the US and Russia in parts of the Wider Europe, and especially in the Greater Middle East. The very idea of overlapping cobwebs becomes so complicated that such systems are hardly likely to be sustainable in practice. Either one hub dominates, or the hubs coordinate. For this the *Rubik cube* image is suggested, adding a third dimension to the matrix.[4] Solutions are possible but of course difficult to organise.

These images lead on to the substance. The Wider Europe may tend towards a cobweb system around the EU. For the Greater Middle East either the US, the EU and Russia find Rubik cube solutions, or the influence of the lesser hubs will be secondary or of a token nature.

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[4] For a detailed application of this model see M. Emerson and N. Tocci, *The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East,* CEPS, 2003.

Table 2. Simplified matrix of the Wider Europe and its neighbourhood

	Political & human dimension		Economic dimension			Security dimension	
	Democracy & human rights	Education, culture & research	European economic area	European monetary area	European infrastructure & network area	Freedom, security & justice	Cooperation in external security
Wider Europe							
1. EEA/EFTA & micro states							
2. Accession candidates							
3. Balkans (SAA states)							
4. European PCA/CIS states							
4a. Russia							
4b. Bel/Ukr/Mold							
4b. Caucasus							
Greater Middle East							
5. Mediterranean							
5a. Maghreb							
5b. Mashrek							
6. Gulf (GCC), Iraq, Iran							
7. Central Asia & Afghanistan							
Pan-European areas							
8. Council of Europe map							
9. OSCE, EBRD, NATO-PfP							
Overlapping regions							
10. Baltic Sea							
11. Black Sea							
12. Mediterranean Sea							

4.   Common European spaces

While Wider Europe policy can be approached from either the bilateral or thematic sides of the matrix, here the thematic approach is preferred as the place to start. There are already lively but rather chaotic discussions underway about *common European policy spaces,* which take place mainly in the bilateral dialogue between the two European hubs – the EU and Russia. This debate deserves to be become more open and inclusive. One may start with the three large 'dimensions' following the OSCE and the Stability Pact for South East Europe, as in Table 2. However these may best be broken down into seven main groups of policies to be tractable in operational terms. Here the several spaces adopted in EU-Russian discussions are retained, completed by two additional and highly important 'spaces' (democracy and human rights, and monetary affairs). Each space is now identified and commented on very briefly.

A. Political and human dimension

- *A common space of democracy and human rights.* Here the Council of Europe is well placed to work alongside the EU as a key partner in the Wider Europe. Priority should be given to the least ordered states of the Council of Europe.

- *A space of education, culture and research.* EU programmes are rightly being opened increasingly to the Wider Europe. There should be no conditionality beyond quality, given that these investments are looking decades ahead.

B. Economic dimension

- *A European economic area (for trade and market regulations).* The EU should propose an open-ended multilateral Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA) and develop a modular approach for progressive inclusion in the EU single market, with a restructuring of existing EEA/EFTA institutions.[5]

- *A European monetary area (for euro and macroeconomic matters).* The EU's official documents are still ignoring the inevitable extension of the euro into the Wider Europe. Its doctrine is excessively restrictive even in the conditions for the new acceding states, whereas for non-acceding states and entities the policy line needs to be more open and reasoned (some micro-states and sub-state entities are already fully euroised).[6]

- *A European infrastructure and network area.* Pan-European networks in transport, energy (oil and gas pipelines, electricity grids) and telecommunications are being developed with EU/EIB/EBRD financial support, for which the overriding condition should be the economic efficiency of the network as a whole.

C. Security dimension

- *A common space of freedom, security and justice.* Powerful incentives can be offered to the individual states of the Wider Europe, offering increasing freedom of movement of persons (visas and immigration), in exchange for improved border controls and domestic law and order.

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[5] For a critique of recent EU-Russian discussions about a Common European Economic Space, see Carl B. Hamilton, *Russia's European Economic Integration – Escapism and Realities,* working paper, Stockholm School of Economics, April 2003.

[6] For a critique of present EU policies, see C. Wyplosz, "Who's Afraid of Euroisation?", CEPS Commentary, www.ceps.be, 19 June 2003.

- *A space of cooperation in the field of external security.* EU instruments of security and defence policy are developing, and can support the Europeanisation process in the still unstable parts of the Wider Europe.

5.   Institutions and organisations

The Wider Europe needs an adequate multilateral institutional structure, which the European Union has the main responsibility for devising. The *European Conference* may be usefully retained as a standing conference for dialogue on the Wider Europe agenda, but this very thin and ad hoc arrangement should be reformed. It should be opened to all the member states of the Council of Europe, and to a degree linked to this organisation, with which the EU already increasingly develops practical cooperation on topics relevant for Wider Europe policy.[7]

Regional structures should be supported, where they have both geographic rationale and political value. The Baltic, Barents and Mediterranean Seas have seen the development of substantial regional structures, as is also the case for South-East Europe. The political concept of 'dimensions', as in the Northern Dimension, seeks to build up the concept of regional cooperation into something more political. The Black Sea (BSEC organisation) is the main instance of neglect by the EU, which deserves to be corrected given that EU candidate states now account for half of its coastline, and because of significant policy interests (energy supplies, security and conflict resolution).

The key *EU-Russia strategic partnership* develops already quite fast, and could be strengthened institutionally, for example with the aid of a joint EU-Russian Council of Ministers.

For the rest of the Wider Europe the EU should take a fresh look at its complicated array of *association arrangements*, which presently include association agreements with states, association with overseas countries (i.e. not states) and territories, and with other entities in Europe having close relationships with EU member states. These arrangements, themselves needing clearer classification in legal and political terms, should be opened up to serve the needs of various sub-state entities, as well as Europe's advanced micro-states and entities, and those emerging from conflict situations. One can conceive of ways of including associated states partially into the EU institutional system, to the point where the most advanced states may become virtual member states.[8] Participatory arrangements could in principle be devised for all the institutions, with examples suggested in Box 1. The only red line that cannot be crossed before acceding to full membership status would seem to be a voting seat at the table of the Council of Ministers (one might also add having a Member of the European Commission, if all member states are to continue to be represented in future).

The Commission has proposed a new category of *'Neighbourhood Agreements'*, to be preceded by Action Plans. The Convention has proposed agreements that would 'develop special relationship(s) with neighbouring states'. The Commission makes 'full implementation' of existing agreements a precondition for any new development, but this is

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[7] The 19th Quadripartite meeting between the EU and the Council of Europe took place on 17 June 2003, with EU (Greek) Council Presidency, the Commission, and the Secretary General and (Moldovan) Chairman in office and of the Council of Europe. The concluding statement is itself an illustration of Wider Europe policy at work. Its headings include: EU enlargement, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood, European Convention, South Caucasus, Moldova, SouthEast Europe, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia, Russia, Belarus, Migration, International Criminal Court.

[8] For a detailed account of how the EEA system works, see M. Emerson, M. Vahl and S. Woolcock, *Navigating by the Stars – Norway, the EU and the European Economic Area*, CEPS Paperback, 2002.

so vague as to be virtually meaningless, and certainly devoid of incentive effect at this stage. This 'full implementation' condition should be dropped, also since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for CIS states (for example) have in any case become increasingly obsolete, as the EU's own policies have developed and the states in question become increasingly differentiated.

Box 1. Possible mechanisms for partial participation in EU institutions by associated states and territories

- *European Parliament*. Inclusion in a neighbouring constituency of a member state (for a micro state/entity), or an observer or full member (where population reaches average constituency size)
- *European Commission.* A Commissioner will have relations with the associated states and entities in his portfolio of tasks
- *Council of Ministers*. A member state chosen by the associated state or entity may be mandated to speak on its behalf. In the voting of the Council of Ministers under the double majority proposed by the Convention, the mandated member state may cast the population vote of the associated state or entity separately. A representative of the associated state or entity may attend as observer within the delegation of the mandated member state in open legislative sessions
- *European Court of Justice.* Full jurisdiction
- *Economic and Social Committee.* An observer (for micro-states and entities), or full member (where the population reaches average European Parliament constituency size)
- *Committee of the Regions*. As for the Economic and Social Committee
- *European Investment Bank.* Full eligibility for project financing
- *European Central Bank*. Fully part of the euro area, but with no seat on the Governing Council of the European Central Bank; possibility for limited minting of euro coins (e.g. Monaco euro)
- *Citizenship*. Citizens have full rights as for member states; passports may bear the identification 'European Union', followed by the name and symbol of the entity, and possibly a triple identity where the entity has a special relationship in or with a member state*
- *Agencies of the EU***. Participation may be granted if useful.
- *Staffing in the EU institutions.* Eligibility for staff appointments on the basis of merit.

*For example citizens of the Åland Islands carry passports whose cover page indicates the triple identification of EU, Finland and Åland.

**For example, agencies of the EU include:
- European Environment Agency
- European Training Foundation
- European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug-Addiction
- European Monitoring centre on Racism and Xenophobia
- Office for the Harmonisation in the Internal Market
- Agency for Safety and Health at Work

The *Action Plan* idea should not just be focused on what the states of the Wider Europe should do to conform better to EU norms, as if the process were just a weaker version of the regular reports produced for accession candidates, for which the reference is complete adoption of the *acquis*. For the Wider Europe the EU itself has to propose ideas for the common European spaces, and to process these into policy commitments, in order to establish the references and incentives for the process. This should be based on a comprehensive series of *Green or White Papers for the Wider Europe*, one each for the seven common European policy spaces identified above, with further papers on a) institutional issues including association arrangements, b) regional organisations structures and c) economic aid (see

below). The Action Plans for individual states of the Wider Europe could then be structured along the lines of the common European policy spaces, reviewing opportunities and performance under each heading. The Action Plans should also review institutional issues, in the light of possible new categories of association arrangements for states, countries and territories.

The total of ten White or Green Papers may seem a lot, but the figure should not be surprising. The subject matter is extremely complex if a comprehensive list of common European policy spaces is to be pursued seriously. More precisely one could imagine separate Green Papers being prepared by each of the concerned directorates general of the Commission according to common guidelines, to be submitted for debate with partner states of the Wider Europe as well as EU member states, with the Commission then to draw up an overarching Wider Europe White Paper.

Economic aid from the EU is granted on the basis of an exceedingly complex set of differentiated rules and regulations for aid to states of different groups. These should be made more user-friendly for the context of the Wider Europe, notably for projects overlapping neighbouring states falling into different political categories. The Commission published in July 2003 a second Communication with proposals going in this direction, and also proposing a New Neighbourhood Instrument post-2006.[9] The conditionality question needs systematic consideration. Aid allocations should be partly conditional on policies of the partner government, but there should be important exceptions for long-term investments whose time horizons extend way beyond political terms of office, as for example in education programmes and pan-European network infrastructures.

6.   Wider Europe and conflict resolution

The Wider Europe policy framework should reach out to the most disorderly zones of the European periphery, especially to the South East, from the Balkans to the Caucasus. The EU is uniquely well placed to introduce a quasi-constitutional element, and indeed vision, to aid resolution of the ethno-secessionist conflicts that erupted with the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of Yugoslavia. A systemic view of the possibilities is set out in Box 2, which distinguishes three or four tier multi-tier governance systems (sub-state, state, region, EU supranational (or multilateral, with a wider coalition of external powers and organisations). In particular an overarching EU tier of governance may be decisive in stabilising conflict-prone and weak states and entities of the Wider Europe, in some cases holding together fragile federative structures. Such solutions should be considered a normal part of the constitutional system in ethnically complex regions, for both advanced and peaceful societies (e.g. Belgium) as well as those that unfortunately succumbed to civil war before being able to return to peace and reconciliation. Variants on this three (or four tier) model have been proposed (and almost accepted in 2003) for Cyprus, and the new (still fragile) Union of Serbia and Montenegro may be interpreted in this light too.

For the EU to extend its vision of the Wider Europe to these still disordered parts means retain the possible use of a full range of arrangements typically used by a major power: the protectorate, the associated state and integration. Annexation is excluded from the politically acceptable methods of modern democracies, but is included in the taxonomy of Box 3 for completeness since the idea is not so out of context in some cases (e.g. Turkey/Cyprus, Russia/Abkhazia).

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[9] European Commission, *Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument*, Com (2003) final, 1 July 2003.

Box 2. Taxonomy of solutions to ethno-secessionist conflicts

One tier – Secession and/or unitary state(s)
1. Secession denied, unitary state prevails
2. Secession and independence, recognised internationally
3. De facto secession and independence, non-recognised

Two tier – with federative solutions
4. Federation (one state in international law, decentralised powers)
5. Confederation (two states in international law, some common policies)
6. Common state (one state in international law, some common policies)

Three tier – with regional cooperation
7. Regional community of two or more states and sub-state entities)

Four tier – with role of supranational or external powers
8. Multilateral, e.g. OSCE/UN/Council of Europe
9. 'Europeanisation'/'Russification'/'Pax Americana' (for overarching protection/association/integration/annexation)
10. Coalition/consortium/condominion, e.g. EU and Russia, or troika of EU-RUS-US

Box 3. On protectorates, association, integration and annexation

o **Protectorate**. An external power keeps the peace with the aid of military or police forces as necessary, and may also exercise powers of civil administration. The external power may be invited or uninvited, which means different degrees of democratic legitimacy.

o **Association.** A self-governing entity adopts some or even many of the policies and laws of an external power, usually its much bigger neighbour, but without becoming part of the political structure of the neighbour. This regime derives its legitimacy from being voluntarily sought or accepted.

o **Integration.** The entity voluntarily becomes a full part of the economic and political structures and jurisdiction of the (formerly 'external') power.

o **Annexation.** When this integration happens through the use or threat of force, or without the consent of the parties directly concerned, or the legitimising agreement of the international community.

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7.   The Greater Middle East

Even before the Iraq war there was a growing movement of ideas among Arab scholars in favour of the region's progressive democratisation as a key to modernisation and development.[10] The UNDP report in 2002, written by Arab scholars, provided a template document, with a focus on the three deficits – of freedom, women's empowerment and human capabilities and knowledge.[11]

Faced with the issue how to respond, several models of Western policy may be identified:

- *Model 1. Acquiescence,* with priority given to regime stability, even when the regime is authoritarian and repressive. A blind eye is turned to objectionable regime features. It is now appreciated that such regimes have not only failed to deliver economic and social progress, but have de facto contributed to the environment that produced the new global terrorism. The conclusion has to be that the time has run out for Model 1.

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[10] Fares Al-Braizat, *The EU and Democracy Promotion in the Southern Mediterranean – Is it working?,* CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper No. 5, CEPS, forthcoming, 2003.

[11] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Arab Human Development Report*, UN, New York, 2002.

- *Model 2. Passive engagement,* with political dialogue over democratic values and human rights, but without significant incentive measures or pressures over democratic values and human rights. Economic development is seen as a forerunner to democratisation. This has been the EU's approach under the Barcelona process so far, which has some merits, but has not seen impressive results.

- *Model 3. Active engagement,* in a more holistic approach, calling for political, economic and human development in parallel, strengthening the emphasis on democratic values and human rights, with more significant incentives. This may be the model for the period ahead, but it has so far not been really tested in the region.[12]

- *Model 4. Hostile engagement,* against objectionable regimes. This includes sanctions but can bring in a wider arsenal of diplomatic measures. The track record of sanctions policies world-wide is uneven to say the least, and the reverse logic of counterproductive effect is well known. However the pre-war sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime had some success as containment.

- *Model 5. Forceful regime change,* meaning war in the extreme case, or political pressures backed by credible threats of force. Bombing, invasion and military occupation are the models of Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. But the workings of this model for establishing sustainable democracy and modernisation remain uncertain and hazardous. Even today the military occupation of Afghanistan is judged so hazardous that it is confined to the capital, whereas in Iraq resistance to the occupation becomes ominous.

8.   Recalibrating the Barcelona process

The EU could plausibly recalibrate its Barcelona policy from Model 2 to Model 3, and may already be inclined to do so gradually.[13] However it is in the nature of the partnership concept that this be done with the aid of incentives, and not force. The US, in the shadow of the war with Iraq, develops a Middle East Partnership Initiative, which is similar to the Barcelona process in combining technical assistance (to education, business development and democratisation) with trade policy initiatives (bilateral free trade agreements). The financing and trade flows on the US side remain small by comparison with the EU. US policies are here switching from Model 1 to Model 3, while its main action has been in the switch for Iraq from Model 4 to Model 5, with threats of the same for Iran. The EU has also shifted its position implicitly over Iran closer to the US position, in acknowledging the possible legitimacy of use of force to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (moving here to somewhere between Models 3 and 4).

The prospects for EU-US coherence at the strategic level are therefore not non-existent,[14] yet they depend on two essential conditions: resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the outcome of the Iraq war. For the US these two theatres of operation seem to be linked through the need for the US to rescue the calamitous state of its public reputation in the Arab world,

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[12] See R. Youngs, *The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World,* CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper No. 2, 2002.

[13] This is being advocated by Commissioner Chris Patten in "Democracy Doesn't Flow from the Barrel of a Gun", *Foreign Policy,* September-October 2003.

[14] Obvious opportunities for coordination exist between the EU Barcelona process and the US Middle East Partnership Initiative launched by Secretary of State Powell in December 2002, with the intention of supporting a wide range of educational, governance and private sector developments. The initial budget of $20 million, which can only support pilot schemes, is to be increased to $145 million next year, which would remain however only a small contribution.

its public opinion approval ratings having fallen virtually to zero in some cases. For the EU the belated turn of the attention of the US administration to the Israel-Palestinian conflict with the aid of the Quartet's Roadmap was welcomed, although the process seems to be deeply flowed. For Iraq the risk now is that conflict between the people and the occupying powers degenerates to the point that this theatre of operations may be taking over from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories as touchstone for Arab resentment towards the West.

It may be that the US and its coalition partners will extricate themselves from Iraq once some kind of improvement on the Saddam Hussein regime has been established, possibly with the UN taking over responsibility for the transition to self-government. The EU itself can hardly determine the outcome at all directly. However it can continue a Wider Middle East policy mainly in the sense identified above (Model 3), with a focus on both state-building and region-building. The EU has already signalled a partial convergence of its security strategy in the direction of the US, the Solana document having acknowledged the possible use of force, on condition of multilateral legitimacy, to remove threats of weapons of mass destruction conditions.

If there was some breakthrough over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is achieved, the road would be open to renew the drive in favour of regional cooperation. While the Barcelona process embraces the whole Mediterranean basin, in a next stage the EU could foster deeper sub-regional cooperation with the Mashreq and Maghreb regions. It could offer the perspective of institutional developments that could be more jointly owned, correcting in some degree the highly asymmetric Barcelona process, which has no organisation of its own, relying entirely on the institutions of the EU. The ideas of forming Euro-Mashreq and Euro-Maghreb Communities can be sketched. The enlargement of the EU way into the Mediterranean with the accession of Cyprus and Malta opens new opportunities. The EU could for example propose that a new Euro-Mashrek Community have headquarter facilities (secretariat, etc.) based in Cyprus, and the Euro-Maghreb Community similar facilities in Malta. The EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relationship also holds out prospects for further development. As and when decisive progress is made in the Middle East peace process, Israel should be offered advanced association possibilities (official discussions between Israel and the EU over possible accession to the European Economic Area apparently have already begun). [15]

This recalibration of the Barcelona process, with increasingly important Maghreb and Mashrek sub-regional components, would see this process as the leading element of EU policy towards the Greater Middle East, rather than a lagging and somewhat incongruous element of the Wider Europe.

9.   Summary

This paper proposes recalibrating, clarifying and further developing the initial policy ideas of the EU on the Wider Europe in the following directions:

➢ Distinguishing between the Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East.

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[15] See A. Tovias, *Mapping Israel's Policy Options regarding its Future Institutionalised Relations with the European Union*, CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Working Paper No. 3, March 2003, and M. Emerson and N. Tocci, op. cit. See also *Financial Times*, "EU seeks closer Israel partnership", 18 June 2003.

➢ Identifying the Wider Europe more closely with the Council of Europe, using its membership map as a defining characteristic, which also establishes the basis of common norms of democracy and human rights.

➢ Adopting a comprehensive view of this continental Wider Europe, embracing all states and entities other than those that are already negotiating accession, and certainly including the weakest states and entities of the region (e.g. to include the Caucasus and signal opportunities for Belarus in due course).

➢ Providing a systematic framework and incentives for the bilateral Action Plans proposed by the Commission,

  o developing the ideas of common European policy spaces into operational propositions, seven of which may be identified, and for each of which the Commission should prepare a Green or White Paper, and

  o taking a fresh look at actual and conceivable categories of institutional association of states and entities of the Wider Europe with the EU, to provide maximum incentives for the Europeanisation without or before full accession.

➢ Shifting in this way the balance between bilateral and regional/multilateral approaches to a degree in favour of the latter.

➢ Recalibrating the model of EU policies for the Barcelona process and the Greater Middle East in a more holistic approach, with greater emphasis on democratic values and human rights alongside economic reform and human development, and seeking to re-establish effective partnership with the US in this direction.

➢ Focusing increasingly on sub-regional formats in the Greater Middle East (Maghreb, Mashrek, Gulf), with new possibilities for the Mashrek now becoming conceivable with progress on the Roadmap for the peace process.

➢ Exploiting opportunities of the EU's enlargement way into the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, with proposing Malta and Cyprus respectively as headquarter locations for new Euro-Maghreb Community and Euro-Mashrek Community organisations, whose structures would be more symmetrical than embodied in the present Barcelona process.

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